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The Noble Business of "lncumbantocracy:" A Response to The 
Sordid Business Of Democracy1 
CHRISTOPHER J. ROEDERER• 
If democracy is a sordid business-a base, dirty, and ignoble business­
then perhaps it is not too much of a stretch to say that there is something 
simple, clean, and noble about the business of "incumbantocracy." This 
should ring a discordant note. "lncumbantocracy," and not democracy, is the 
problem which calls for the courts to intervene. "lncumbantocracy" involves 
the sordid business of gerrymandering districts and fixing elections so that 
those in power stay in power, regardless of what the voters might wish or how 
they vote.2 "Incumbantocracy" is dirty politics, and trying to eliminate this 
practice is, no doubt, a dirty and difficult job; but one should not confuse the 
problem with the solution. If democracy is, in fact, a sordid business, the 
alternatives are much worse. As Abraham Lincoln once said, democracy 
consists of a "government of the people, by the people, for the people. "3 
Democracy is supposed to include the "continuing responsiveness of the 
I. This essay is a response to Daniel Tokaji, The Sordid Business of Democracy, 34 Ohio N.U. L. 
Rev. 341 (2008). The tenn "incumbatocracy" appears to have been coined by Jamin B. Raskin in The 
Supreme Court's Double Standard, where he argued that "voters don't really pick public officials on 
Election Day because public officials pick voters on redistricting day." THE NATION, Feb. 6, 1995, at I 67-
68. 
* Associate Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law; Senior Research Fellow, University 
of the Witwaters and School of Law. The author thanks Melanie Schneider from Florida Coastal School 
of Law for her able research assistance, Professors Cleveland Ferguson and Gerald Moran for their helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of this work, and Professor Burt Neu born for clarifying a few points in relation 
to his own work on the subject. 
2. As Burt Neubom states, "[t]he major party in this country is neither the Republicans nor the 
Democrats. It is the Incumbent party that runs the country. The incumbent party draws the district lines so 
that you simply cannot defeat an Incumbent." Burt Neubom, Campaign Finance and Political 
Gerrymandering Decisions in the October 2005 Term, 22 T0UR0 L. REV. 939, 944 (2007). It is important 
to note that while the House of Representative is an incumbantocracy, that form of government has not 
quite taken over the Senate or the Presidency. This is because Senate races are statewide and not based on 
gerrymandered districts and because in most states in the U.S. the Electoral College votes in block based 
on who wins a majority in the state (except in Maine and Nebraska). There is a recent disturbing trend 
underfoot to undermine the democratic process in the case of Presidential elections. The law finn for the 
California Republican Party has sponsored ballot Initiative No. 07-00032, The Presidential Election Refonn 
Act, which is designed to allocate electoral votes by district instead of in block or winner take all. Hendrick 
Henzberg, Comment: Votescam, The New Yorker (August 6, 2007). Note that the Democrats are proposing 
the same thing in North Carolina. Id.
3. Abraham Lincoln, 16th President of the United States of America (1861-65), The Gettysburg 
Address (Nov. 19, 1863). The U.S. State Department begins its discussion of the definition of "What is 
Democracy" with Lincoln• s definition. U.S. Department of State, What is Democracy? (1998) (quotation 
omitted), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/whatsdem/whatdm2.htm. 
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government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals. "4 
The present state of "incumbantocracy" in the U.S. all but ensures that 
"representatives" do not, in fact, represent the people. They are not 
accountable or responsive because there is little to no political pressure to 
keep them accountable. 
Professor Tokaji' s illuminating article, The Sordid Business of 
Democracy, embraces the role of the courts in policing or superintending the 
"messy business of democracy. "5 In this article, Professor Tokaji uses the lens 
of democratic values in order to bring clarity to the voting rights case, League 
of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry ("LULAC"),6 and to all voting 
rights cases in general.7 More importantly, he uses LULAC in an attempt to
identify a role for the federal courts in securing the democratic process. 
He examines the voting rights jurisprudence through the lens of the four 
"norms of democracy," which he believes are at stake in these cases.8 These
norms include: 1) minority representation, 2) raceblindness, 3) anti-entrench­
ment, and 4) state sovereignty.9 These norms are overlapping and yet com­
peting with one another, so that too much emphasis on one is said to detract 
from one or more of the others. 10 He is largely successful in illustrating how 
the Supreme Court has taken a somewhat strong position on all four norms at 
different times, only to pull back, or retreat, to a more modest position on all 
four norms. 11 The pull of these competing norms, he explains, accounts for 
the seeming incoherence of the court's approach to this area of the law. 12 He 
claims that LULAC is somewhat unique in that it lies within the overlap of 
these often competing norms. 13 
More importantly, ProfessorTokaji should be commended for attempting 
to identify a "seed of encouragement" 14 in LULAC for those who believe, or 
perhaps hope, that the federal courts either have, or should have, an important 
4. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition l (1971).
5. Tokaji, supra note 1, at 341.
6. 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
7. Tokaji, supra note 1, at 342.
8. Id.
9. Id. 
10. Tokaji, supra note 1, at 349.
11. Tokaji, supra note 1, at 353. However, I believe that Proffessor Tokaji would admit that he is 
not successful in showing that the Court has ever taken a strong stance on the value of anti-entrenchment. 
Not only has the Court never found a redistricting plan to be partisan enough to violate the norm, the norm 
as stated by Professor Tokaji is very weak from the perspective of a thriving democracy, namely - "there 
ought to be some competition between the political parties, at least for some legislative seats." Id. at 350. 
12. Tokaji, supra note 1, at 342-43.
13. Tokaji, supra note 1, at 353.
14. Tokaji, supra note 1, at 342.
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role in helping American democracy function better. 15 Most of the 
commentators on LULAC would identify a "seed of encouragement" in the 
fact that five out of the nine Justices still hold out hope of a justiciable, con­
stitutional, equal protection claim in a future political gerrymandering case. 16 
Professor Tokaji writes almost apologetically concerning the majority's 
decision to avoid the equal protection-based political gerrymandering claim, 
which it found to be nonjusticiable on the grounds that there was not a 
judicially manageable standard in front of the Court. 17 He does not locate the 
glimmer of hope, or "seed of encouragement" here, but rather in the plurality's 
decision to hold that the Tom Delay-backed Texas redistricting of District 23 
violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 18 Professor Tokaji argues that the 
heart of the section 2 debate provides encouragement for those who believe 
that the federal courts have an important role to play in "making American 
democracy function better."19 He posits that this is because the statutory 
interpretation, found here, borrows from a process-based approach to 
constitutional law, as found in Carolene Products footnote four2° and the 
earlier works of the late John Hart Ely.21 This borrowing, he argues, furthers 
democratic values.22
Although it is not my goal to destroy the seed of hope, I do not have the 
same rosy view of the current state of "American democracy," and I am not 
sure that the "seed of encouragement" has much room to develop under 
LULAC or within our current electoral practices. My reasons for this 
somewhat less rosy view are that: 
(1) Our system is so far off the track of democracy23 that it is
incorrect to view federal courts' interventions as interventions
in the "messy business of democracy." Rather, those
15. Id.
16. While two Justices (Justices Thomas and Scalia) do not believe such claims can ever be 
justiciable, and two others (Chief Justice Roberts and Ali to) are agnostic or uncommitted on the issue, five 
Justices (Justices Bryer, Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter and Kennedy) are open to the possibility of a justiciable 
standard to resolve these cases. See e.g., Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry 
As A Judicial Test for Partisan Gerrymandering After LUI.AC v. Perry 6 ELECTION L. J. 2, 34 (2007) 
(stating, in regard to the possibility of a justiciable standard for a constitutional equal protection claim in 
political gerrymandering cases: "In our view, if we look closely at the various opinions in LULAC, we can 
see that the Supreme Court has seeded the clouds after 20 years drought."). 
17. Tokaji, supra note 1, at 353. 
18. Tokaji, supra note 1, at 342. 
19. Id.
20. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
21. John Hart Ely, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEoRY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ( 1980). 
22. Tokaji, supra note 1, at 342. 
23. For a full argument on this point, see Christopher J. Roederer, Democracy and Tort Reform in
America: The Counter-Revolution, 110 W. VIRGINIA L. REV. 647 (2008). 
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interventions are interventions of a limited nature into the 
corrupt practices of "incumbantocracy." 
(2) It was not the minority-protecting, democratic-process approach
to interpretation, as found in footnote 4 of Carotene Products,24 
that drove the Court to its interpretation of the section 2 claim in
the case of District 23,25 but rather it was the Voting Rights Act
that pulled the Court into making a decision that was consistent
with a minority-protecting process view.
(3) The success of the section 2 claim in the case of District 2326 had
more to do with Justice Kennedy's animus towards the newly
created minority-majority Latino District 25 than with protecting
the democratic process. 27 
(4) If the minority-protecting, democratic-process approach to
interpretation drove the Court's decision in District 23' s section
2 claim, then one would expect the same values and the same
approach to come to the forefront in the section 2 claim
regarding District 24; but it did not, and that claim failed. 28
(5) Although racial discrimination in voting is still an issue,29 the
overwhelming problem is with partisan gerrymandering. This
practice receives little to no scrutiny under existing U.S. voting
laws, and there is minimal hope for protection under LUI.AC in
the future.
I. THE U.S. D OESNOTPRESENTLYHAVEADEMOCRACYFOR THE COURTS
TO SUPERINTEND.
Unfortunately, the problem is not one of hoping that the Courts will
superintend the borders of a thriving democracy. The system is in such 
disrepair that there is very little of that "messy business of democracy" taking 
place. Rather, what is needed is for the courts to intervene in the corrupt 
practices of "incumbantocracy" in order to put the system back on the 
24. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
25. Tokaji, supra note I, at 356-57. 
26. Id.
27. Tokaji, supra note I, at 355. As ProfessorTokaji notes, Richard H. Pildes made this argument 
in The Decline in Legally MafliUJted Minority Representation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1139, 1144 (2007) 
(arguing that this view of the case squares Kennedy's opinion with his hostility to the compelled creation 
of majority-minority districts, e.g., in Georgia v. Ashcroft 539 U.S. 461 (2003) (Kennedy, I. concurring)). 
28. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2624-2626 (2006). 
29. See e.g., Michael J. Pitts, Let's Not Call the Whole Thing Off Just Yet: A Response to Samuel
Issachorojfs Suggestion to Scuttle Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 84 NEB. L. REV. 605 (2005) 
(referring specifically to discriminatory voting practices in Georgia). 
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democratic track. As an historian of voting, Alexander Keyssar, states: 
"Although the formal right to vote is now nearly universal, few observers 
would characterize the United States as a vibrant democracy[.]"30
In 2004, the American Political Science Association warned that 
American democracy was in peril. They delivered this warning with a press 
release31 and through a set of reports commissioned by the Association.32 
Those reports located the cause of this demise in the widening gap between 
the rich and poor. As its authors stated, "(p]rogress toward realizing [the] 
American ideals of democracy may have stalled, and in some arenas 
reversed," due to the broadening gap in income and wealth in America.33 The 
impact of the gap between the "haves" and "have-nots" on democracy is 
explored in detail in the American Political Science Association Task Force 
Reports on Inequality and American Democracy.34 In describing the results 
of the report, two of its authors stated: 
[The] privileged participate more than others and are increasingly 
well organized to press their demands on government. Public 
officials, in tum, are much more responsive to the privileged than to 
average citizens and the least affluent. Citizens with lower or 
moderate incomes speak with a whisper that is lost on the ears of 
inattentive government officials, while the advantaged roar with a 
clarity and consistency that policy-makers readily hear and routinely 
follow.35 
30. ALExANDERKEYSSAR, THERIGHTTOVOTE:THECONTESTEDHISTORYOFDEMOCRACYINTHE
UNITED STATES 4,320 (2001). For the view that our democracy is crumbling based on current obstacles 
to voting, see SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY: THE NEW POLITICS OF VOTER SUPPRESSION 
(2006). 
31. Press Release, American Political Science Association, Leading Political Scientists Warn of 
Threat to American Democracy in Rare Nonpartisan Statement (2004), http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/ 
taskforcepress.pdf. 
32. The task force compiled a series of reports in 2004: AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN AN AGE OF
RISING INEQUALITY; THREE CRITICAL ANALYSES ON ECONOMIC, GENDER, RACIAL, AND E1HNIC INEQUALITIES 
IN AMERICAN POLITICS; and a set of teaching materials. The American Political Science Association, Task 
Force on Inequality and American Democracy, http://www.apsanet.org/section_256.cfm (last visited Nov. 
5, 2007). These materials were edited into a book. INEQUALITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: WHAT WE 
KNOW AND WHAT WE NEED TO LEARN (Lawrence R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol eds., 2005). 
33. TASKFoRCEONlNEQUALITY&AM.DEMOCRACY,AM.POL.SCI. Ass'N,AMERICANDEMOCRACY
IN AN AGE OF RISING INEQUALITY I (2004), http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/taskforcereport.pdf. This is 
not to say that healthy levels of economic inequality are antithetical to democracy. Certain levels and certain 
forms of economic inequality become problematic from the standpoint of democracy when they undermine 
either fair equality of opportunity or our civil and political liberties. 
34. TASK FORCE REPORTS, supra note 33.
35. INEQUALITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE NEED TO LEARN
27 (LAWRENCE R. JACOBS & THEDA SKOCPOL EDS., 2005). See also Kay Lehman Schlozman, On 
Inequality and Political Voice: Response to Stephen Earl Bennett's Critique, 39 POL. SCI. & POL. 55, 56 
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According to some studies, the poorest one-third of Americans have virtually 
no influence on national legislation and the bottom two-thirds have less than 
half the influence of the top one-third. 36 
There can be little doubt that economic inequality has undermined 
American democracy, but how is this so? If American democratic processes 
were functioning correctly, economic inequality would not result in inequality 
ofresponsiveness and accountability. If the democratic process were working 
properly, then the poor person's vote would not count any less than that of the 
rich person's.37 Politicians would need to listen, to be responsive to, and to 
be accountable to all of the electorate. "Incumbantocracy" short circuits these 
processes. If the incumbents are allowed to gerrymander districts in order to 
rig the outcome of the next election, then there is little need to listen to the 
voters, much less be responsive or accountable to them. This, in tum, leads 
to even lower voter tumout38 and to further erosion of other forms of 
democratic participation. 39 Thus, we need the courts to intervene, not in order 
(2006) (referring to KAY L. SCHLOZMAN ET AL., TASK FORCE ON INEQUALITY & AM. DEMOCRACY, 
INEQUALITIES OF POLITICAL VOICE, 30-33 (2004), available at http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/ 
voicememo.pdf. 
36. Larry Bartels, Is the Water Rising? Reflections on Inequality and American Democracy, 39 PoL. 
SCI. & POL. 39, 40 (2006); See also Stephen Macedo & Christopher Karpowitz, The Local Roots of 
Inequality, 39 POL. SCI. & POL. 59, 60 (2006); Larry M. Bartels, Economic Inequality and Political 
Representation (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Princeton University), available at 
www.princeton.edu/-bartels/economic.pdf; Martin Gilens, Public Opinion and Democratic Responsive­
ness: Who Gets What they Want from Government? (2003), available at http://www.princeton.edu/-csdp/ 
events/pdfs/Gilens.pdf. See also Martin Gilens, discussing Public Opinion and Democratic 
Responsiveness: Who Gets What they Want from Government? The Center for Study of Democratic 
Politics, Princeton University, conference on Global Inequality (Nov. 7-8, 2003). 
37. Unquestionably, campaign finance law also contributes heavily to the current state of affairs. 
At the end of 2002, Congress increased hard money campaign contribution limits in the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act (McCain-Feingold Bill), 2 U.S.C. § 44 lb(b)(2) (2000) (upheld in McConnell v. 
FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)). This basically means that those with more money get more access. Although 
state based limits on campaign finance have generally been upheld, limits on campaign spending have not. 
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). This has created incredible pressure to find loopholes in the 
finance regulations so as to feed the demand. Although some of these holes were plugged through the 
McCain-Feingold Bill, many loopholes remain. Recently, the Court, for the first time, struck down a state's 
campaign finance restrictions. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006) (striking down Vermont's 
campaign finance restrictions as being so low as to infringe the First Amendment). 
38. See KEYSSAR supra note 30, at 320. According to the International Institute for Democratic and 
Electoral Assistance, the U.S. ranks 138th out of 169 countries in voter turnout. RAFAEL L6PEZ PINTOR 
ET AL., VOTER l'URNOUT RA TES FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 75, 83-84 (2002) (citing statistics of 
averages of voting age population ratios across 169 countries in parliamentary elections from 1945-2001, 
compiled by the International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance). 
39. KAY L. SCHLOZMAN ET AL., TASK FORCE ON INEQUALITY & AM. DEMOCRACY, INEQUALITIES 
OF POLITICAL VOICE 22, 38 (2004), http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/voicememo.pdf. 
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to police the contours of a thriving democracy, but in order to restore the 
system to something that would be worthy of the name. 
II. THE LUIAC COURT DID NOT BRING A PROCESS APPROACH TO THE ACT
FROMCONSTITUTIONALINTERPRETATION. RATHER,THEVOTINGRIGHTS
ACT ITSELF EMBODIES DEMOCRATIC PROCESS VALUES, PARTICULARLY
WITH REGARD TO THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES.
As Professor Tokaji notes, the democratic process view, as found in
footnote four to United States v. Carolene Products,40 justifies the Court's 
practice of more carefully scrutinizing state legislation when "discrete and 
insular minorities" are involved41 • This is because it cannot be assumed that
normal democratic political processes will adequately represent or protect 
such minorities. This is particularly true given the form of this country's 
voting system, which does not provide proportional representation.42 
Although it is not entirely clear whether Professor Tokaji finds a glimmer 
of hope in the process-based view of constitutional interpretation or the 
democratic value of anti-entrenchment,43 he argues that even though the Court 
has declined to protect the democratic process under the rubric of 
constitutional law, it does so when it interprets section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act. He makes the rather remarkable claim that: 
If this case is any indication, the Court will likely be reluctant to inter­
vene on constitutional grounds, even in cases where there is arguably 
a breakdown of the democratic processes that can ordinarily be relied 
upon to protect minorities. On the other hand, it is possible that the 
Court will resort to statutory interpretation to achieve a similar end.44 
This raises the question as to why the Court would decline to protect the 
democratic process on constitutional grounds, yet be willing to protect it on 
statutory grounds. One answer that is consistent with Professor Tokaji's 
framework is that the constitutional equal protection claim only included the 
issue of discrimination based on political affiliation, not based on race or 
40. 304 U.S. 144 n.4 (1938).
41. Id. Tokaji, supra note l, at 357-58.
42. Pippa Norris, Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems,
18(3) INT'L POL. SCI. REV. 297-3 12  (1997) (SPECIAL ISSUE), available at 
http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/ Acrobat/IPSR %20Choosing%20Electoral%20Systems.pdf. 
43. Tokaji, supra note 1, at 357. According to Professor Tokaji, the section 2 claim was not merely
about racial vote dilution, but also about "curbing entrenchment by those in power," and therefore, he 
believes that this may be a signal that that the Court will "more carefully scrutiniz.e incumbent-protecting 
gerrymandering than it has in the past." It should be noted that illegitimate entrenchment is one result of 
a flawed political process. 
44. Id. at 358.
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minority status, while the section 2 claims also included a claim of discrimina­
tory impact on a discrete and insular minority. Thus, the latter claims 
included another process factor-namely the discrete and insular minority 
factor. This is consistent with Tokaji's argument that the Court borrowed 
from the process approach to constitutional interpretation in order to arrive at 
a decision that would help democracy function better. Although it is not 
completely implausible to locate the seed of hope in the Court's approach to 
section 2, it is not the best explanation for the seed's origination. 
The seed of hope for policing the democratic process is not located in the 
Court's approach to section 2, but rather, is located within section 2 and the 
Voting Rights Act itself. It is not as if the Court brought the values and tools 
of the process approach to bear on an otherwise neutral piece of legislation. 
This was not what Cass Sunstein would call "judicial maximalism."45 The 
Court did not need to engage in a great deal of interpretive work on section 2, 
in order to bring it into conformity with democratic process values or the 
process approach. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act embodies the process 
view, and the drafters specifically designed it to protect minorities within the 
electoral process. As the Court in LULAC stated: 
A State violates § 2 if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is 
shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election 
in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to 
participation by members of [ a racial group] in that its members have 
less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in 
the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.46 
The Court has not taken the process approach and used it to expansively 
interpret this language in order to police the democratic process, either in 
general or in the case of minority voting. The Court does not apply section 2 
to cases of political gerrymandering or even to the dilution of minority 
population voting in general. Rather, the Court only entertains the merits of 
section 2 claims under carefully circumscribed conditions. 
As Justice Kennedy noted in LULAC, the Court requires that three 
threshold conditions must be met in order to demonstrate a violation of section 
45. Judicial maximalism involves the Court engaging in deep and broad theoretical reasoning in a 
given case. See e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT (1999) (contrasting minimalist and maximalist approaches to adjudication and arguing for a 
minimalist view in most cases, based on deliberative democratic grounds). See ch. 2 and 9. Note, however, 
that Sunstein acknowledges a need for deeper or more theoretically ambitious judicial decisions in cases 
where the democratic process can be shown to be "defective from the standpoint of the inner morality of 
the law." Id. at 245. 
46. League ofUnited Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2613-26 I 4 (2006)(quoting
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2007)) (quotations omitted). 
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2(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 pertaining to vote dilution.47 Those 
conditions, which are known as the Gingles requirements, are: "(1) the racial 
group [must be] sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a 
majority in a single-member district; (2) the racial group [must be] politically 
cohesive; and (3) the majority [must vote] sufficiently as a bloc to enable 
it ... usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate."48 
Section 2 claims are limited to districts in which the minority was a 
majority before the redistricting. One can only successfully invoke section 2 
vote dilution within the context of a district in which a particular minority 
group not only constitutes the majority, but is also politically cohesive enough 
that it votes as a block to defeat the minority candidate. If these three 
conditions are met, then the Court will turn to a totality of the circumstances 
test to determine if "members of a racial group have less opportunity than do 
other members of the electorate."49 
In LUIAC, District 23 satisfied the three Gingles requirements.50 These 
judicially-created requirements ensure that the broad protections of section 2 
are reserved for a few clear, bright-line cases in which a minority should be 
able to elect the candidate of its choice. It excludes all other cases in which 
minorities represent the minority vote in their districts or when they would not 
be able to defeat the majority's candidate. In such cases, the otherwise broad 
democratic process-protecting provisions of section 2 simply do not aid the 
minority voter.51 
The Court is willing to approach section 2 from a process-based approach 
and is willing to superintend the democratic process, because Congress 
mandated it in the Voting Rights Act. The Act requires the Court to find a 
judicially manageable approach to section 2 claims, which as noted above, the 
47. LUI.AC, 126 S. Ct. at 2614. 
48. Id. at 2614 (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986)) (quotations omitted). 
49. LUI.AC, 126 S. Ct. at 2614. 
50. Id. at 2615-16. 
51. See e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 & n.17 (1986). Justice Brennan, writing for the 
majority in Gingles argued that there was no injury to the minority voter if they could not have elected the 
representative of their choice, but for the redistricting. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2007). Section 2 speaks 
of injuries to members of a minority group, while Gingles appears to require that the injury be to the whole 
group as a voting block. If the minority is not a majority and does not vote as a cohesive block, there can 
be no injury under Gingles. Nothing in the text of section 2 compels this narrow view of the injury. 
Section 2 focuses on "less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political 
process and to elect representatives of their choice." Id. There is a very large range of injuries to individual 
members of a minority group, in tenns of each one's ability to elect representatives of his or her choice, in 
comparison to other members of the electorate, that fall short of the Gingles bar. The range can run from 
necessitating that one who is running for office receive the vast majority of the minority voters in order to 
get elected (and having to show that one will represent their interests) to not requiring any of their votes 
(and not having to represent any of their interests). 
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Court interprets narrowly. It is unwilling to cross the street and apply the 
same reasoning to constitutional claims, in large part because the Court lacks 
a consensus as to the appropriate remedy. The old adage from Marbury v. 
Madison was that the violation of a right required a remedy.52 The Court has 
flipped this addage, and since it cannot agree on a remedy, it will not 
recognize the violation of the right. 53 
ill. THE COURT'S DECISION REGARDING DISTRICT 23 WAS MORE 
INFLUENCED BY AN EGA TIVEREACTION TO THECREATION OFMINORITY­
MAJORITY DISTRICTS, THAN BY A NEED TO PROTECT MINORITIES IN THE 
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. 
District 23 satisfied the three Gingles requirements because the redrawn 
district lines decreased the Latino voting share from 57.5% to 46%; this was 
in a district where it was clear that the vast majority of Latinos had voted 
against the incumbent.54 Thus, the Court held that the Latinos in District 23 
were denied an equal opportunity to successfully elect their preferred 
candidate. 55 This holding is rather unremarkable. Seven members of the Court 
would agree that the dilution of District 23 violated section 2;56 only Justices 
Scalia and Thomas held otherwise.57 The Chief Justice's dissent, joined by 
Justice Alito, was not based on the argument that the Latino vote was diluted 
52. 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). Chief Justice Marshall quotes Blackstone for the proposition that "it
is a general and indisputable rule that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or 
action at law whenever that right is invaded." Wil.l1AM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENT ARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 23 (1765-1769). 
53. This is consistent with the Supreme Court's attack on remedies since the time of the Rehnquist
Court. See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Ton Law: Due Process and the right to a Law 
for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005); Andrew M. Siegel, The Coun Against the Courts: 
Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Coun's Jurisprudence, 84 TEx. L. REV. 
1097 (2006); Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal 
Power, 78 IND. L. J. 223 (2003); Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Couns: Hostility to Litigation 
as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Coun's Jurisprudence, 84 TEx. L. REV. 1097 (2006). 
Christopher J. Roederer, Another Case in Lochner's Legacy, The Coun's Assault on New Property, 54 
DRAKE L. REv. 321, 341-42, 342-351, 360 (2006); Roederer, supra note 23 at section V.B. l "Constricting 
Remedies." 
54. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2613 (2006).
55. Id. at 2615-16.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2663 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that section 2 of the Voting rights Act
does not allow for vote dilution claims at all). Justice Scalia stated that he "would dismiss appellants' vote­
dilution claims premised on § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 for failure to state a claim, for the reasons 
set forth in JusticeThomas's opinion, which I joined, inHolderv. Hall." (citing Holder, 512 U.S. 874, 891-
946 (1994)). In Holder, Justice Thomas argued that section 2 of the Voting Rights Act only applies to a 
"voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure" and that voter dilution 
claims are not captured by the terms "standard, practice, or procedure." 
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in District 23, but was based on the argument that the newly-created Latino 
District 25 compensated for the dilution in District 23.58 
Texas Republicans cleverly created a new Latino district-District 25-
that combined geographically and politically-disparate Latinos. Although 
Latinos would, no doubt, have control over the district, they were not 
politically cohesive and, thus, were unlikely to vote as a block. Although the 
Chief Justice saw this gerrymandered, Latino-packed district as more than 
compensating for the loss of District 23, 59 Justice Kennedy and a majority of
the Court did not agree. 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, based his decision on a number 
of points. First, the right to vote is an individual right secured for individual 
voters who meet the three Gingles requirements, and therefore, the violation 
of those rights cannot be repaired by giving another group of minority voters, 
in another location, more concentrated voting power.60 Second, the creation 
of a non-compact district cannot compensate for the breaking up or cracking 
of a compact district.61 Third, if the Court allowed the non-compact district
to remedy the break up of the existing compact district, it would be applying 
different standards to the State than those applied to the claimants. It would 
allow states to create non-compact districts to prevent claimants from demon­
strating that their district is compact, in order to satisfy the Gingles require­
ments.62 This would allow states to break up compact districts and to create
new minority districts, which do not satisfy the Gingles requirements; thus, 
minorities within such a district could not bring section 2 claims in the future. 
Fourth, the minorities combined into District 25 are not only geographically 
disparate but also constitute "'disparate communities of interest' with 
'differences in socio-economic status, education employment, health and other 
characteristics."'63 Finally, "'[t]he purpose of the Voting Rights Act is to
prevent discrimination in the exercise of the electoral franchise and to foster 
our transformation to a society that is no longer fixated on race. "'64 
In its analysis of District 25, the Court focused little attention on process 
arguments or on arguments regarding the need to protect discrete and insular 
minorities. Rather, Justice Kennedy relied on individual rights and the pursuit 
of colorblindness in support of his opinion. The new district is a perfect 
example of why a court might be hostile to group rights or mandated minority-
58. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2652-2663 (2006).
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 2616.
61. LUU..C, 126 S. Ct. at 2617.
62. Id. at 2617-18.
63. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2617 (2006) (quoting the
district court's findings). 
64. Id. (quoting Georgia v. Ashcroft 539 U.S. 461, 490 (2003)).
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majority districts; they tend to perpetuate a stereotype that everyone within a 
minority population is the same and that individual rights can be sacrificed for 
the sake of group rights. 
This line of argument does not draw from the same well as Carotene
Products footnote four, which calls for heightened scrutiny to protect discrete 
and insular minorities, who are in danger of being inadequately protected by 
the democratic process, since those groups, by definition, have minority repre­
sentation in that process. Rather, this line of reasoning is more consistent with 
Justice Kennedy's hostility towards mandatory minority-majority districts. As 
Tokaji notes, the Justice Department was aggressive in compelling the 
creation of "safe minority districts" during the 1990s,65 and the Court, since
the 1990s, has wanted to curtail the creation of such safe districts.66 
Although Professor Tokaji is unclear as to why the Department of Justice 
created those safe districts in the first place, section 5 of the Voting Rights Act 
provides the authority for their creation. Section 5 applies to states and 
counties that were found to have a history of systematically discriminating 
against minority voters.67 Section 5 covers eight states in totality (Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina and 
Texas), 68 and it applies to specific counties and townships in eight other States
(Virginia, North Carolina, New York, California, Florida, South Dakota, 
Michigan and New Hampshire).69 When these jurisdictions had a rampant
history of discrimination, the Act set up a mechanism to insure that they did 
not slide back into racial gerrymandering. 70 This mechanism requires covered
jurisdictions to get preclearance from either the Department of Justice or the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia before they can make 
any changes to their voting practices or procedures (including changes to 
voting districts). 71 
The practice of creating minority-safe districts is a mechanism for 
insulating minorities from vote-dilution. 72 While the packing or concentration
65. Daniel P. Tokaji, If It's Broke, Fix It: Improving Voting Rights Act Preclearance, 49 How. L.J. 
785, 799-806 (2006). 
66. Id.
67. Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 5, 79 Stat. 439 (1965) (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. § 1973c
(2007)). 
68. U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Section 5 Covered Jurisdictions, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt//voting/sec_5/covered.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2007). 
69. Id. In fact, there are very few counties or townships that are covered in Florida, California, 
Michigan, South Dakota, New Hampshire and New York. 
70. Laughlin McDonald, The 1982 Extension of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of /965: The 
Continued Need for Preclearance, 51 Tenn. L. Rev. I, 13, 26-27 (1983). 
71. Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 5, 79 Stat. 439 (1965) (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. § 1973c 
(2007)). 
72. For a defense of majority-minority electoral districts, see Laughlin McDonald, What Happened
to the Voting Rights Act? Or Restoring the White Primary, J. S. LEGAL HIST. 207-45 (1999). 
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of minorities within certain districts in the 1990s may have been done to 
"bleach" surrounding white areas and increase the number of Republicans in 
Congress, 73 it also had the effect of increasing minority representation. 74 From 
the perspective of protecting minority-voting rights, it also had the effect of 
maintaining the cohesiveness of minority-voting blocks, which preserved the 
ability of a given minority to meet the Gingles requirements in order bring 
section 2 claims in the future. 75 
ProfessorTokaji refers the reader to Richard Pildes' s forthcoming article, 
in which Pildes argues that Justice Kennedy's decision in LULAC was 
primarily animated by his hostility towards legally-mandated safe minority 
districts and to the race essentialism that District 25 embodies.76 Pildes goes 
further and raises concerns that Justice Kennedy's decision might double-back 
and impact Shaw claims77 and section 5 dismantling claims.78 Although 
Justice Kennedy stopped short of holding that District 25 alone violated 
section 2 of the Act, Pildes fears that future Shaw-type claims, attacking race­
based districting, will be able to draw on Justice Kennedy's decision in order 
to challenge districts that are not "ideologically coherent."79 While Shaw 
merely required geographical coherence, Justice Kennedy believed this was 
Id. 
73. Tokaji, If It's Broke, Fix It, supra note 65, at 801.
74. Id. at 800. As Tokaji himself notes:
After the post-1990 redistricting, the number of African Americans elected to Southern state
legislatures increased from 204 to 260, while the number of African Americans elected to
Congress from the South increased more than fourfold, going from four to seventeen.
Nationwide, the number of Blacks elected to the House went from twenty-one in the 98th
Congress (1983-85) to thirty-nine in the 103rd Congress (1993-1995). The number of
Latinos also increased, going from twelve to twenty in this period.
75. This assumes, of course, that the packing is not in the mold of District 25 in Texas, which packs
minorities together from different regions, who are not politically cohesive, do not share interests, and are 
unlikely to vote as block. 
76. Tokaji, supra note l ,  at 356; Pildes, supra note 27, at 1146.
77. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (2003), and its progeny represent a line of cases in which white
voters have brought equal protection challenges to districts drawn on race-conscious grounds. 
78. Pildes, supra note 27, at 1145, 1148. As Pildes states:
The Shaw cases had held that race-conscious districting had to be limited, for constitutional
reasons, to districts that were reasonably compact geographically. LULAC now adds to this
the constraint that such districts must be, not only geographically compact, but ideologically
coherent-and, most importantly, coherent in a deeper or broader sense than that minority
voters share a preference for minority candidates pitted against majority ones. That is,
districts must be 'culturally' as well as geographically compact.
Id. at 1145. 
19. Id. at 1145.
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insufficient in the context of a section 2 claim. 80 Pildes' s second worry is that 
districts lacking ideological compactness might not be covered by the stronger 
protection of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which prohibits "retrogres­
sion." He argues, "[i]f there were no legal obligation to create such a district 
in the first place, as the Court now understands the Act, then undoing such a 
district might not be retrogressive."81 
While Professor Pildes's concerns might be slightly exaggerated, they 
make it clear that LULAC does not adopt a process view of section 2 claims 
as its goal. Protecting discrete and insular minorities in the political _process 
is neither its primary aim, nor its probable effect. 
N. THE SEED OF HOPE, WHICH PROFESSOR TOKAJI CLAIMS CAN BE FOUND
IN THE DISTRICT 23 CLAIM, DID NOT SURVIVE IN THE DISTRICT 24
CLAIM.
Unlike District 23, in which the three requirements above were met, 82 the
three requirements were not met in the case of District 24. 83 District 24 had 
two minority voting blocks-one black and one Latin�which consisted of 
approximately 26% and 21 % of the voting population, respectively.84 The
Anglo voters constituted just under 50% of voters.85 The black vote was 
considered a swing vote that, if cast in a block, would determine the outcome 
of the election (in fact, it had ensured that the Anglo incumbent, Martin Frost, 
was reelected every time since 1974).86 District 24 argued that their vote 
would ensure the reelection of Frost and that by cracking the district and 
splitting the black vote, the Republicans had diluted their vote under section 
2.81 
The Court noted that, even if one assumed that it might be possible for 
a racial group that did not make up the majority of voters within a district to 
get over the first prong of the three-part test, it would still need to show that 
it could elect a candidate of its choice.88 Since the incumbent was an Anglo­
Democrat who had never had any opposition in the primary, the Court held 
80. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2618 (2006). It should be
noted that Justice Kennedy referenced the difference between Shaw-type equal rights claims and section 
2 voting rights claims, noting that geographical compactness was at issue in the former type of case, while 
minority group compactness was at issue in the later type of case. 
81. Pildes, supra note 27, at 1148.
82. LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2615-16.
83. Id. at 2624-26.
84. Id. at 2624.
85. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2624 (2006).
86. Id.
87. Id. 
88. Id.
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that it was just as plausible that this was an Anglo-Democratic district.89
Through somewhat strange logic, testimony that the Anglo incumbent might 
not have truly served the African-American community evinced that it was not 
clearly erroneous for the court below to hold that black voters could not elect 
their candidate of choice.90 
While they did not get their candidate of first choice, their block (no 
doubt) ensured that they did not end up with a candidate that was their last 
choice. In other words, while they lacked the power to put up their own 
candidate, who could effectively challenge the Democratic incumbent in the 
primary, they appeared to have the power to ensure that the Anglo-Democrat 
would be elected over the Republican opponent. The Court, by allowing for 
the Republicans to crack the black vote in this way, ensured that they would 
not have the power to keep their last choice out of office. 
If the process-based approach of Carolene Products footnote four carried 
much weight, one would think that Justice Kennedy would agree with the 
dissenting opinions of Justice Stevens,joined by Justice Breyer,91 and Justice 
Souter,joined by Justice Ginsburg,92 who argued that the cracking of District 
24 constituted a section 2 violation.93 The Court's interpretation of section 2, 
which mandates that there is minority-voter dilution only when a minority 
group has obtained the status of a majority in any given district, is not a bold 
footnote 4 move. Rather, it is a bright-line standard that reserves section 2 
claims for those clear cases where a minority that has become a majority is 
arbitrarily reduced to a minority again. The fact that the Court could not move 
away from this bright line and recognize that the cracking of District 24 was 
also a violation of section 2, indicates that the Court is not concerned with a 
breakdown of the democratic process. 
Taking a minority block of voters and splitting them up to ensure that 
they have very little influence in the next election, falls squarely upon footnote 
four of Carolene Products. The black voters in District 24, a discrete and 
insular minority, had their vote diluted in a way that undermined their ability 
to be represented in their district. The redistricting had the effect of spreading 
the minority block in District 24 into five new districts-Districts 6, 12, 24, 
89. Id. at 2624-25.
90. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2625 (2006).
91. Id. at 2626, 2641-46.
92. Id. at 2647-2651.
93. One would think that Justice Kennedy would have been extra sensitive to power of a minority
block that can act as a swing vote. In this case, as in many others over the last decade, he has taken on the 
role of the swing voter. This has given him considerable power, as one who can either join the proverbial 
left or the right of the Court on any given issue. What would happen to the power of his vote if they 
expanded the Court to eleven members and appointed two more Justices, either to his left, or to his right? 
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26, and 32.94 This redistricting was not part of a democratic process, but its 
purpose and effect were to further distort democracy by entrenching the 
effective disenfranchisement of black minority voters. The Court responded 
by arguing that the acceptance of such claims would "unnecessarily infuse 
race into virtually every redistricting plan, raising serious constitutional 
questions."95 Here, the Court explicitly rejected the minority-protecting 
process view. 
It is inconsistent with the spirit of Carolene Products footnote four to 
withdraw the protection of discrete and insular minorities, simply because 
they could not command a majority within a given district, particularly when 
it is clear that the minority block can exercise its voting power to form a 
coalition and eliminate a candidate that is its last choice. Since it is unclear 
whether the minority block could get its first choice, the Court is not going to 
protect the block's ability to secure its second-best choice against its worst 
option. Thus, the Court abandons discrete and insular minorities, which 
remain on the verge of absolute dilution, unrepresented, and powerless to 
eliminate the candidate they prefer the least.96 
V. THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IS MORE WIDESPREAD AND
PRESSING IN THE AREA OF PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING THAN IN
SECTION 2 CLAIMS. YET NEITHER THE COURT'S DECISION IN LUI.AC, NOR
JUSTICE KENNEDY'S OPINION, PROVIDE MUCH HOPE THAT THE COURT
WILL ACT WITH VIGILANCE TO PROTECT THE PROCESS.
While Professor Tokaji should be commended for trying to find seeds of
hope in hard to find places, if the analysis above is correct, there is little room 
under LULAC for those seeds to grow. If there is room for growth, political 
scientists, such as Grofman and King, are likely correct that the area of 
political gerrymandering has the most potential.97 Although beyond the scope 
of Professor Tokaji's article, partisan gerrymandering is briefly addressed 
here, in order to demonstrate that if the Court was concerned with 
safeguarding the democratic process, it could have, and should have, taken the 
opportunity to do so. 
Rather than embracing a role for the courts to superintend the democratic 
process, Justice Kennedy appears to think that the Court's involvement would 
94. LUI.AC, 126 S. Ct. at 2647 (Souter, J., dissenting in part).
95. LUI.AC, 126 S. Ct. at 2625 (citing Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461,491 (2003) (Kennedy,
J., concurring)). 
96. Robert Dahl, in DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989), claimed that the ability to vote out an
incumbent in the next election was a necessary condition for democracy. 
97. Grofman and King, supra note 16.
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be contrary to notions of the democratic process.98 He begins with the premise 
that the legislature is best suited to draw congressional districts.99 As he 
states, "drawing lines for congressional districts is one of the most significant 
acts a state can perform to ensure citizen participation in republican self­
governance. That Congress is the federal body explicitly given constitutional 
power over elections is also a noteworthy statement of preference for the 
democratic process."100 He does not acknowledge or even appear to recognize 
that states have been drawing these lines so as to undermine citizen 
participation and republican self governance. As Burt Neuborn states: 
In the 2006 campaign, out of the 435 available House seats, thirty-five 
are contestable seats. Four hundred of the seats have been so rigged 
and so gerrymandered that they are uncontestable. By using the 
criteria of the American Political Science Association, you know who 
is going to win before you cast your ballot. The election is a 
formality. The reality took place when the lines were drawn in the 
state legislature. 101 
Rather than taking action to safeguard the democratic process, the Court 
threw out some seeds for the legal community to ponder. As noted at the 
outset, a majority of the Court is open to the possibility of a justiciable 
standard for adjudicating such claims; Justice Kennedy, the key swing voter, 
is himself open to this possibility within narrowly circumscribed situations. 
However, in order to have the seeds planted, one must persuade the Court that 
a judicially manageable standard exists. While the Court may have "seeded 
the clouds" so to speak, one should not expect a downpour of justiciable 
claims in partisan gerrymandering cases; rather, as in the section 2 cases, there 
is potential for the Court to hear a few bright-line instances. 
Political scientists Grofman and King, whose approach is widely used by 
experts and accepted by academics for determining partisan fairness in 
elections, have proposed the use of a partisan symmetry criterion for 
determining prima facie cases of political discrimination in gerrymandering. 102
As they note, five members of the Court in LUI.AC indicated that the criterion 
could be used as one part of a multipart test in partisan gerrymandering 
98. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2608 (2006).
99. Id.
100. Id. 
101. Neubom, supra note 2, at 944-45.
102. Grofman and King, supra note 16, at 4, 6. As King and Browning note: "We are aware of no
published disagreement or even clear misunderstanding in the scholarly community about partisan 
symmetry as a standard for partisan fairness in plurality-based American elections since the clarification 
and measures introduced by Gary King and Robert X. Browning in Democratic Representation and 
Partisan Bias in Congressional Elections." 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1251, 1267 (1987). 
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claims. 103 The partisan symmetry standard" 'requires that the electoral system
treat similarly-situated parties equally, so that each receives the same fraction 
of legislative seats for a particular vote percentage as the other party would 
receive if it had received the same percentage [of the vote]."' 104 
Partisan symmetry itself will only reveal how symmetrical the vote inputs 
are, as compared to the vote outputs. One still needs to reach a threshold of 
sufficient dissymmetry, or in other words, to demonstrate a sufficient level of 
dissymmetry that would constitute unconstitutional gerrymandering. Grof man 
and King set out five different threshold tests, all of which are judicially 
manageable.105 The thresholds range from requiring the plan to: ( 1) have as
little bias as practicable; 106 (2) not be predicted to result in the unfair loss of
a seat; 107 (3) not be predicted to be egregiously unfair in terms of a percentage
amount of dissymmetry (e.g., 1, 3, 5 or 10%); 108 (4) not be expected to result 
in a party receiving a minority of votes, yet receiving a majority of the seats; 109 
or (5) not result in asymmetry that is both severe and worse than the previous 
plan.110 
The threshold tests are listed according to the level of aggression; if one 
wanted to aggressively defend the democratic process, then option (1) is the 
strongest test. Of these five options, Justice Kennedy has only indicated some 
support for the latter two options, which are rather limited tests. While the 
technology and science of voting has reached a point where these test could 
be applied to accurately predict results, 111 Justice Kennedy stated in LUI.AC
that the Court is "wary" of adopting a test that would apply to hypothetical 
election results in the future, as opposed to a test that was applied after an 
election has taken place."2 Perhaps most importantly, Justice Kennedy 
distinguishes cases in which a majority further entrenches itself by giving 
itself more votes through gerrymandering from those cases in which a 
minority is able to gerrymander the majority into a minority of seats.113 As 
103. Id.
l 04. Id. (quoting King et al., Amicus Brief in LULAC v. Perry (2006) Submitted on Behalf of Neither
Party in the U.S. Supreme Court (No. 05-276) (2005)). Note that Grofrnan and King state in footnote 8 that 
the amicus was submitted in Jackson v. Perry, was consolidated into LULAC. 
105. Grofrnan and King, supra note 16 at 21-25. As they note, under any of these thresholds, the
determination of a violation would be straightforward, and any given state or line district line-drawer would 
know in advance whether a proposed plan would pass review. Id. at 25. 
106. Id. at 21.
107. Id. at 21-22.
108. Id. at 22.
109. Grofrnan and King, supra note 16, at 22-24.
110. Id. at 24-25.
II I. Id. at 21.
112. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2611 (2006).
113. Id. at 2610.
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Grofman and King point out, this latter case is less likely to occur, since it is 
generally the majority that draws the lines to help consolidate its majority 
position. 114 
If Justice Kennedy, and thereby the Court, cannot be moved to adopt a 
less restrictive test, there is not a great deal of hope that the federal courts will 
play an active role in superintending the democratic process. Rather, they will 
continue to make the occasional incursion into policing a thriving American 
"incumbantocracy." 
114. Grofman and King, supra note 16, at 23. Of course, over time a party may find itself in such
disfavor that it no longer gets a majority of votes and then its redrawing of the districts would fall into the 
latter category. As the authors note, this was the case of the 1991 pro-Democratic gerrymander in Texas. 
Id. at 23. 

